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THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL 
KENNETH J. HODSON LECTURE: 
A LEGAL SYSTEM LOOKING FOR RESPECT 
MILITARY JUSTICE FOR THE 1990’s- 
by David A.  Schlueter 
Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University 
The Kenneth J. Hodson Chair of Criminal Law was established at 
The Judge Advocate General’s School on June 24, 1971. The chair 
was named after Major General Hodson, who served as The Judge 
Advocate General from 1967to 1971. General Hodson retired in 1971, 
but immediately was recalled to active duty to serve as the Chief 
Judge of the A m y  Court of Military Review. He served in that posi- 
tion until March 1974. General Hodson served over thirty years on 
active duty. During that time, he was active in the American and 
Federal Bar Associations, and he authored much of the military 
justice legislation existing today, He was a member of the original 
staff and faculty of The Judge Advocate General’s School in Char- 
lottesville, Virginia. When the Judge Advocate General’s Corps was 
activated as a regiment in 1986, General Hodson was selected as the 
Honorary Colonel of the Corps. 
On March 28,1991, Pmfessor Schlueter delivered the twentieth Ken- 
neth J.  Hodson lecture. Professor Schlueter received his B.A. f rom 
lkxm A & M University in 1969, his J.D. f rom Baylor University 
School of Law in 1971, and a n  U . M .  f rom the University of Virginia 
School of Law in 1981. He served on active duty as a judge advocate 
from 1972 to 1981. Professor Schlueter i s  a Lieutenant Colonel i n  
the United States Army  Reserve and i s  a n  individual mobilization 
augmentee to The Judge Advocate General’s School. He has published 
numerous books and law review articles on criminal law top ie  and 
is currently the Reporter for the Federal Rules Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In  addition, Professor Schluet4.r 
has held m e r a l  prominent positions in professional legal organiza- 
tions and currently is the C h a i m a n  of the ABA Standing Cornmit- 
tee o n  Military Law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a double honor to be this year’s Hodson lecturer. First, I have 
the highest regard for General Hodson. I always have respected 
General Hodson and his contributions to the JAG Corps and the legal 
profession in general. As some of you may be aware, he has been 
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very active in the American Bar Association. I regret that he is not 
able to be with us today. Second, being here today brings back pleas- 
ant and warm memories. In many ways the School is my second home, 
and it is always good to be hack among friends. 
In some respects I have been preparing my remarks for this occa- 
sion for almost twenty years. In the process of writing and talking 
about military justice, I have had numerous opportunities to think 
about, or as Justice Holmes wrote, “brood” about the law. Events 
such as the annual Hodson Lecture are good for the system because 
they provide an opportunity to step aside from the everyday hustle 
and bustle of the practice of law, and to think for a moment about 
the larger picture. Today, that larger picture is “Military Justice for 
the 1990’s’’ and its search for a little respect. 
I have the highest respect for the military justice system. In my 
view, it has many features that should be adopted by the civilian 
criminal justice system. For example, features such as broad criminal 
discovery, speedy trial provisions, and worldwide access to witnesses 
and counsel have led people like F. Lee Bailey, a noted criminal 
defense lawyer, to observe the value and benefits of military justice. 
But the object of my time with you this morning is not to praise 
the military justice system. I am sure you already know that the 
system is sound. Rather, I would like to discuss with you what seems 
to me to be a lack of respect for the system by the public and the 
legal profession generally. 
Because I have high regard for the system, and because it has been 
a large part of my legal career, I am disturbed when I hear from those 
who have no respect for the system. 
How much have you heard about military justice from those out- 
side the system? I know that my exposure to the criticisms of military 
justice was extremely limited in the early years of my service on ac- 
tive duty. I was too wrapped up in the day-to-day grind of writing 
appellate briefs, post-trial reviews, and trying cases to really spend 
too much time thinking about the system. My first real exposure was 
in my third year on active duty when I heard that a writer had com- 
pared military justice to military music. At about the same time I 
became aware that my staff judge advocate at Fort Belvoir, Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Robert Poydasheff, was eo-authoring an article with 
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Suter for the Tulane Law Review on the 
merits of the military justice system.‘ 
’Poydasheff &I Suter. Military Justic.r?-Defi’nitrly!, 49 ‘ h i .  L.  Kev. 588 (1975). 
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My perspective is broader now and is based not only upon my years 
of active duty in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, but also on 
my experiences as a civilian who has talked with many individuals 
over the last twenty years about military justice. I have had countless 
contacts with the media, military personnel, law students, and or- 
dinary citizens-including my barber, who asked me the other day 
whether I thought the military justice system was fair. 
11. LOOKING FOR RESPECT: 
NEGATIVE SOUND BITES 
A.  IN GENERAL 
In the process of working within the system, several attempts have 
been made to increase the stature and prestige of the military justice 
system. For example, some have suggested that the names of the 
military appellate courts be changed to the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy Court of (Military) Appeals. This change is an attempt to in- 
crease the stature of military appellate courts. In the case of the 
United States Court of Military Appeals, some have suggested that 
it be changed from an article I to an article I11 court. Indeed, a few 
years ago the name of the Court of Military Appeals was changed 
by Congress by adding the words “United States” to make it clear 
that it was a federal court and not simply a military court of appeals. 
Why the search for respect? For increased prestige? In part, it is 
an attempt to overcome the negative image that sometimes is at- 
tached to military justice. You are no doubt aware of the use of what 
have become known as “sound bites,” media jargon for those short, 
pithy, and catchy phrases that will stick with the public-those 
phrases that seem to say it all. 
Consider the following examples of bites regarding military justice. 
Perhaps you have heard some of them: 
“Military justice is to justice as military music is to music.”2 
“Courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in deal- 
ing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law.”3 
%I. Sherrill, Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music (1970). Mr. 
Sherrill presents a highly critical view of military justice. The title is a quote from 
Clemeceau. 
30’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (determining that only service- 
connected offenses were subject to court-martial jurisdiction). 
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“The court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of 
justice.”4 
“Military justice is an oxymoron.”5 
“Military Tribunals have not been and probably never can be 
constituted in such a way that they have the same kind of 
qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair 
trials of civilians in federal courts.”G 
Is this the same military justice system that I have been connected 
with for almost twenty years and the system that you have been 
studying Note that these negative bites or criticisms are about a 
worldwide legal system that affects directly and indirectly literally 
millions of United States citizens. True, there are negative impres- 
sions about civilian criminal justice systems as well. My sense, how- 
ever, is that they do not run as deep as those associated with military 
justice. 
B. IDENTIFYING THE CRITICS 
Who are the critics and why are they saying negative things about 
military justice? Perhaps we could cut this presentation short by sim- 
ply dismissing the negative sound bites as those of individuals who 
have no knowledge about justice generally or have nothing good to 
say about any system of criminal justice. Perhaps they are only quotes 
from a bitter parent upon learning that a son or daughter has been 
sentenced to prison for not following what was obviously an illegal 
order or for being just a little late for chow. No such luck. They are 
statements by commentators who have read the cases, by counsel 
who have worked within the system, and yes, they include state- 
ments by Supreme Court justices. 
C. BREADTH OF THE CRITICISM 
The true depth and breadth of the “negative bites” is unknown. 
As far as I know, no recent national surveys have been conducted 
among the citizenry about their perceptions or feelings about military 
justice. Nevertheless, I do feel safe in believing that a broad cross- 
section of intelligent people either know very little about military 
justice or, if they do know something about the system, they believe 
41d. 
”Spak, Mil i tary  Justice: ThR Oxymoron of the 1980’s, 20 Cal. W.L. Rev. 436 (1984). 
%th v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
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that it is still in the dark ages, void of any full legal recognition, and 
certainly not deserving of a full membership in the family of enlight- 
ened jurisprudence. Clearly, it does not deserve “respect.” 
D. REASONS FOR THE CRITICISM 
1. In  General 
Why the negative bites? Why the criticism? What has the military 
justice system done or failed to do that evokes such criticism? I believe 
a number of possible reasons exist for the negative impressions that 
many people have about military justice. Rightly or wrongly, they 
believe the system is unfair and inept. Some of these reasons overlap 
and are not the result of any poll or survey. Rather, they are the obser- 
vations of one who has played on the field from time to time and 
has sat next to the fans in the stands to hear what they have to say 
about how the game is being played. 
2. Reason One: Lack of Information 
Even the best intentioned individuals do not have all the informa- 
tion. This is perhaps the easiest to address because many people simp- 
ly have no reason to come in contact with military justice. Pre- 
sumably, once these individuals have accurate information about the 
system, they will be less likely to criticize it summarily. 
3. Reason W o :  Reliance on Old Data 
Some misconceptions and criticisms are based upon outdated in- 
formation about the way it once was-the days when a convening 
authority could order a court-martial to reconsider its sentence with 
the hope of raising the punishment, the dqys when a single counsel 
served as both prosecutor and defense counsel, the days when the 
prosecutor and the defense counsel both worked for the same per- 
son, the days when judges were not present in the courtroom and 
the president of the court-martial was the presiding officer. As noted 
by Judge Cox of the Court of Military Appeals, the military justice 
system has evolved a great deal since that time.7 Judge Kenneth Rip- 
ple, a former Navy JAGC officer who now sits on the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, believes that military justice is 
a more “mature” system of justice.” 
7.be  Cox, The: A m y ,  m Cirrurts, rind thrn (,’onTtitutiori: E?’?xilutio,n of MiliLrqy .Justirr, 
“Ripple, FwYU)fn-d to I). Schlueter, Military Criminal .Justice: f’ractice and f’roc(dur(~ 
118 Mil. L. Rev. 1 ,  18 (1987). 
at xxiii (2d ed .  1987) [‘‘A new maturity has come to military law”). 
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My first real exposure to the historical and changing roots of 
military justice began in a legal history course offered at the Univer- 
sity of Virginia in the late 70’s when, in fulfillment of a paper re- 
quirement, I worked my way through yellowed leaves of old codes 
and old treatises on military justice. I was impressed with several 
aspects. First, despite the fact that some features have not changed, 
many aspects of military justice had changed dramatically. Second. 
the element of “due process” had continued to expand in the military 
setting, and in some cases set the pace for like changes in the civilian 
setting. 
The “unification” of military justice in the 1951 Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which replaced the Articles of War, was clearly a 
major step forward. In the 1960’s, through the efforts of individuals 
such as General Hodson, the system was “judicialized” by the addi- 
tion of judges in the courtroom. Decisions of the Court of Military 
Appeals in the 1970’s continued to strengthen the role of the judge. 
The 1980’s brought what some have termed the “civilianization of 
military justice”-with the 1983 Military Justice Act and the 1984 
Manual for Courts-Martial. Now, we might be entering a period of 
what I call the ‘‘legitimization’’ of military justice. 
The system has changed-it has been improved upon in the sense 
that the system is fairer. Checks have been provided to ensure fairer 
and more just results. For many, however, the system used in the late 
60’s, especially in Vietnam, is the system they remember-and detest. 
4. Reason Three: Relying o t i  Fulse Data or Assicniptioris 
Some critics simply do not have any real frame of reference to 
military justice. They know only what they see on television or read 
in the papers. For example, consider a recent episode of the popular 
TV series, “LA Law.” 
A young Army officer was charged with disobeying an order to fire 
an artillery barrage on some buildings during the invasion of Panama. 
His reason for not firing was that he had seen civilians in the area. 
One of the law firm’s lawyers was asked to represent him. Whpn he  
was asked why he simply did not use the services of his military 
defense counsel, he said something to the effect that his lawyer was 
good, but, “. . . he wore a green uniform”-the implication being that 
only a civilian lawyer could see that justice was done. H e  was (*on- 
victed and received a heavy sentence. 
Without belaboring the legal points, the scenario containcd st.vcral 
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inaccuracies, and the public was left with an incomplete and mis- 
leading picture of military justice. 
5. Reason Four: The Experience Factor 
Some of the critics of military justice have been involved with the 
system. Recently, the following letter appeared on the editorial page 
of the San Antonio Light, in a city where the military generally is 
held in high regard: 
Noth ing M i t  iga tes Pu n ish m e TZ t 
in Military Justice Systenz 
Regarding the trial arzd sentencing of Sgt Meeks: My henrt 
goes out to h im and to his family. I n  July 1988, I was i~ the 
same spot. Military justice is an  oxymoron-there is no justice. 
Once you are identified as an offendei; absolutely tzothi,ig will 
deter the military law office from doing what it warits to do. 
It does not matter how good n pwson you nre, how well yoti per- 
formed, the qualitiesof yoiirjobskills, or  the ,~~i,~iber.of'letteis 
of recmnmenclcltion (or who wrote t h m ) .  They do not care about 
your f a m  ily circumstances. 
AppeaLs a n d  clemency appeals are yoicr right bitt cow- 
manders arid courts will not nlter o w  th irig. Why? the trr ilitavy 
lair center coritiriiies to oppose you. They brarid ewrythirrg got( 
say as n lie. Whatetier they recouzvietid is al i i~ays  n p p r o c ~ d  hg 
the comrriander because he will riot, does w t .  or  carrrrot toke 
the time to personally giiv the uiatter proper cotrsidemtiori. 
But there is lrfe qfter the sewice as  lorrg ns y o r i  dorr't let i t  
get y01i dOlV?l. 
ROL1'.4LD T4lZOR 
Str ) I  -4 rrtorr i o 9  
As the Air Force Court of Military Review recently ohserved. "No 
man goes to the gallows with a good impression o f  the law."1o C'lear- 
ly, that young man does not have a good impression of militan. justice. 
Whether he is right or wrong is irrelevant. Anyone reading that let- 
ter to the editor was exposed to  military justice for one brief 
"negative bite" moment. 
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6. Reason Five: The Rub-Off Factor 
Some critics approach military justice with the attitude that if it 
belongs to, or is run by, the military then it must to be unfair. “Isn’t 
this the same system that serves SOS and MREs?” “Military justice. 
Isn’t that the system run by folks with military minds?” “Isn’t that 
the system that discriminates against homosexuals?” You get the pic- 
ture. I have no doubt that the negative feelings toward the military 
that resulted from Vietnam had a direct impact on the public’s 
perception of military justice. Perhaps the recent military successes 
in the Middle East, which have enhanced the public’s view of the 
military in general, also will benefit military justice. 
7. Reason Six: The Other Alternative 
Another possibility exists. Perhaps there is some truth in what the 
critics see and what they say. In day-to-day JAG Corps life, it is easy 
to become complacent, to fail to see the forest because of the trees. 
We are doing what a former JAG urged us to do: “Just cut the wood 
that is put in front of you.” It was mentioned in the context of not 
worrying about getting the right assignments, working for the right 
people, etc. But while you are cutting the wood, it is important to 
examine it, to measure it, to test its worth. 
11. RESPONSES TO THE CRITICISMS: 
CLOSE SCRUTINY 
A .  IN GENERAL 
There is a simple saying that when you are right, ignore the criti- 
cism. When you are wrong, listen to the criticism. Let us assume, 
for the purposes of argument, that some of the criticisms of the 
military justice system are valid. That is, if the critics are right, what 
should our response be? 
These are not purely questions of academics. They are pragmatic 
questions, and any suggested solutions should have utility. Changes 
should not be made simply for the sake of change. Nor should changes 
be made simply to silence the critics, or to increase or decrease the 
conviction rate. 
I have high regard for military justice. In my view, its benefits great- 
ly outweigh whatever faults it may possess. Although one commen- 
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tator has labelled me as a “defender” of military justice,” I always 
have assumed that the military justice system is not perfect, that 
there is room for change-for improvement. I also have assumed that 
listening to, and thinking about, the “negative bites” is the first step 
to improving the system. For example, I often have pondered about 
what led Justice Douglas in 1960 to write that military courts are 
singularly inept at dealing with constitutional questions. 
B. WHY LISTEN To THE CRITICS? 
Why should the military justice system pay any attention to what 
the critics say? Is not the system currently providing ample due pro- 
cess? These questions were put to me several years ago by a military 
judge in an audience I was addressing. Why should we care? Why 
should we in the military care about what a federal district judge 
sitting in Minnesota or Texas thinks about military justice? Let me 
offer several reasons why the critics may deserve our ear. 
1. Always Subject to Scrutiny: Someone Will Listen 
First, even assuming the system is separate, it is always subject to 
scrutiny-either internally or externally-in Congress, in the media, 
or perhaps even in a federal court. It is important to remember that 
the greatest time of change in the military justice system usually has 
occurred immediately following a major war or conflict. This was par- 
ticularly true after World War I,  World War 11, and to some extent 
during and after Vietnam. Granted, the federal courts today are for 
the most part extremely deferential on military justice matters-prob- 
ably due in large part to the fact that the services are composed of 
voluntary enlistees. But I become concerned when I hear individuals 
within the system register utter disdain for civilian control of the 
system and suggest that civilian courts have no business second- 
guessing military justice. Like it or not, the system is constantly sub- 
ject to scrutiny. 
2. Not Entirely Separate From Society 
Second, although the military justice system is a “separate system 
of justice,” it is not entirely separate from the rest of society. It is 
ultimately accountable to the civilian community-not simply civilian 
legal review. The recent war in the Gulf pointed that out. The armed 
forces consist of many citizen service members-mothers, fathers, 
and children. That is particularly true of the reservists and National 
“Spak, supra note 5 ,  at 464 n.179. 
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Guard members. One day they were plowing fields, pulling teeth, or 
teaching classes, and the next day they were stuck in a desert far 
from home. They all have a potential interest in the military justice 
system, and it seems appropriate that the public have confidence 
in the system. Many of you are, or will be, active within the civilian 
community as Little League coaches, PTA officers, leaders in your 
religious organization, or members of the local bar associations. You 
are not entirely separate from society simply because you wear a 
uniform. 
3. It Is the Right Thing to Do 
Third, like eating oatmeal, it is the right thing to do. Criticisms 
should not be ignored simply because they irritate or annoy us. If 
we are wrong, then we should listen. Those participating in any legal 
system have a professional and moral responsibility for policing the 
system. Those who are within the system should be the first to step 
forward and make changes where needed. In military jargon, those 
within the system must be “proactive,” not simply “reactive.” 
111. FEATURES OF MILITARY JUSTICE THAT 
DESERVE SCRUTINY 
Assuming that we decide to heed at least some of the criticisms, 
where would we begin? What is a legitimate problem or issue? A 
number of features of the system seem most vulnerable. They are 
as follows: 
A. The Purpose of Military Justice 
B. The Concept of “Military Due Process” 
C. Constitutional Protections 
D. The Role of the Commander 
E.  The Role of the Military Judiciary 
F. An Independent Court of Military Appeals 
G. The Role of the Legal Profession 
These points are listed in no particular order or hierarchy. Although 
other issues may be equally important, these should serve as a good 
starting point. 
A .  THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY JUSTICE: 
JUSTICE OR DISCIPLINE? 
In its earliest forms, the military justice system was designed to 
10 
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be an instrument of discipline. Military leaders could count on the 
system to enforce the articles of war and their personal orders. The 
system was at  times rough by contemporary standards of due pro- 
cess. It would be difficult to say that, in its early forms, the military 
justice system was an “independent” tool of justice-that is, a system 
designed to determine if a person was guilty of a particular crime. 
The debate over the two concepts has continued for years and will 
certainly not be resolved by anything said here. I do not see the two 
terms as being inconsistent. There should be no doubt, however, that 
if military justice is to be viewed as a legitimate system of criminal 
justice in today’s society, it must be viewed primarily as a tool of 
justice. 
Consider the following excerpt from a report made thirty years ago, 
the 1960 Powell Report-a study of the military justice system by 
high-ranking Army officers in a report to the Secretary of the Army 
on the status of the UCMJ: 
Discipline-a state of mind which leads to a willingness to 
obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task 
to be performed-is not a characteristic of a civilian communi- 
ty. Development of this state of mind among soldiers is a com- 
mand responsibility and a necessity. In the development of 
discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in correc- 
tion, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake 
to talk of balancing discipline and justice-the two are 
inseparable. 
Once a case is before a court-martial it should be realized by 
all concerned that the sole concern is to accomplish justice 
under the law. This does not mean justice as determined by the 
commander referring a case or by anyone not duly constituted 
to fulfill a judicial role. It is not proper to say that a military 
court-martial has a dual function as an instrument of discipline 
and as an instrument of justice. It is an instrument of justice 
and in fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.‘2 
This excerpt from the report represents a sound balance. The distinc- 
tions between “justice’ ’ and “discipline” are subtle, but crucial to 
whatever follows. 
It seems to me that at the heart of the controversy is this ques- 
]“The Powell Report, at 11, 12 (1960). 
11 
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tion: What is the purpose of the military justice system? In any given 
case either “justice” or “discipline” may rise to the surface as the 
predominant feature. 
Consider the hypothetical case of Private Doakes, who is charged 
with possession of drugs. What is the purpose of his court-martial? 
What impact would his conviction and sentence have on his unit? 
What impact would an acquittal have on his unit? On the installa- 
tion? On the armed forces? Would your answers change if he was 
charged with willful disobedience of his commanding officer’s order, 
inciting a riot, throwing butter on the mess hall ceiling, shouting in- 
sults at  his first sergeant, refusing to board a plane for Saudi Arabia, 
or child abuse? For the most part, all of these crimes potentially af- 
fect “discipline.” In some of the charges, however, that would be less 
apparent. 
Left unchecked, those crimes also would affect the community in 
which Doakes lived, but in varying degrees. If Doakes is punished 
for crimes involving drugs, his punishment probably will be viewed 
the same way as in a civilian community. “Don’t do drugs.” The same 
would be true for child abuse. But what about the purely military 
crimes, such as willful disobedience of an order? Does the military 
justice system work in the same way? Does it have the same effect’? 
Perhaps. In that case, the trial of Doakes by a court-martial takes 
on an air of discipline because the commander’s very authority to 
command the respect and obedience of the troops is at stake. 
From a civilian perspective, using the court-martial to try military 
offenses is an entirely different creature. While the community very 
well might rally around the prosecution of a child abuser or drug 
kingpin, I doubt that you will see the same support behind the pros- 
ecution of a soldier who will not soldier, is charged with AWOL, or 
fails to show up for morning formation. 
Using the same system to meet often competing goals raises pro- 
blems of interpretation and perspective. Perhaps the answers lie in 
separating those crimes that are purely disciplinary from those that 
are what we ordinarily refer to as “common-law” crimes. The 
military justice system always has lumped them all together because 
of the need or desire to handle all justice problems within a single 
system. I am not suggesting that any changes be made in what crimes 
are triable by the court-martial. The system is worldwide and, in some 
instances, military justice is literally the only law west of the pro- 
verbial Pecos river. 
12 
1991) HODSON LECTVRE 
If “discipline” is viewed as the final end-all for military justice, 
the stereotypes will live on. As long as discipline even is listed as 
a goal or purpose for military justice, there is a risk that the stereo- 
type will live on. The risk exists that if the ends are something other 
than “justice,” those participating in the system will view it as 
nothing more than a rubber stamp for the commander. It is even more 
troubling, however, if the community views the commander as the 
rubber stamp for a legal system that gives the appearance of simply 
serving the needs of discipline. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF “MILITARY DUE 
PROCESS” 
1. Due Process Generally 
The topic of “due process” is mentioned in both the fifth and the 
fourteenth amendments: “No person shall be deprived of life or liber- 
ty without due process of law.” In the criminal context, it requires 
that the right person be accused, that the right procedures be used, 
and that the punishment is right. The concept of due process is fluid 
and is more akin to a balancing test: Balancing the rights of those 
accused, the interests of the public, and the relative costs of pro- 
viding additional procedural safeguard~.’~ 
A hierarchy exists for applying due processJ4 At the bottom is the 
United States Constitution, which provides the foundation. General- 
ly, an accused is entitled to whatever procedural and substantive 
rights the Constitution requires. In the civilian community. no 
jurisdiction may provide less than mandated by the Constitution. 
That rule, as I will point out in a minute, does not necessarily apply 
in the military justice system. In addition to those derived from the 
Constitution, rights are provided by statute, the Manual for Courts- 
Martial, and service regulations. 
A similar template is used in state courts. The state constitutions 
and statutes may provide greater protections than those found in 
the United States Constitution. 
2. Orig in  OJ the Temi “Militccry Lhte Process“ 
So what is this term “military due process” and where did it come 
from? The term has been around for some time in military case law, 
19 
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but it fades in and out of everyday use.16 Generally, it means due pro- 
cess composed of, not only the constitutional protections, but also 
statutory and regulatory features that provide guidance on how the 
military justice system should work. 
Recently it was used in an opinion by the Navy-Marine Corps Court 
of Military Review in concluding that intentional delays in notifying 
the accused of pending charges violated military due process!6 The 
court applied a two-part test: The accused must establish that Con- 
gress granted a fundamental right and that this right was denied dur- 
ing the course of the trial. The court apparently ignored the con- 
cept of fundamental fairness. In my view, that case just as easily could 
have been decided on grounds of lack of due process without refer- 
ring to any congressional action or inaction. 
3. What Is the Problem? It Is On13 a %rm 
The term “military due process” seems relatively harmless. But 
it may be misleading to the extent that it connotes a form of due 
process that is somehow less than the process due to any defendant 
charged with a crime or a template different from the one outlined 
above. It  is also problematic to the extent that it suggests that only 
rights granted by Congress are worthy of protection by the military 
courts. Because the term “Military Due Process” is potentially 
misleading, it should be dropped or used only after reading the pro- 
verbial warning label. Such a label might read as follows: 
The term “Military Due Process” may be misleading and lead 
to incorrect results. Be sure to consult your copy of the Con- 
stitution, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and your Service 
Regulations. 
Simply affixing a warning label to the term, however, will not solve 
the problem if the user does not believe the label or simply decides 
to disregard the danger signs. 
~~~~ ~ 
I5See Quinn, Tiw Unzted States Court of Mzlztary Appeals a n d  Mzlztary Dzir Pro 
I6See United States v Berrey, 28 M J 714, 718 (N M C M R 1989) 
cess, 35 St John’s L Re\ 225 (1961) 
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
1. Do the Constitutional Protections Apply? 
It is easy to forget that the military justice system as you see it 
today is in some ways a youngster in the legal systems of the world. 
Granted, the roots of the system of justice run back to the Roman 
empire, up through the common-law traditions of England, to our 
shores and our Con~ti tution?~ But the system as we know it, with 
all of its due process protections, is relatively young. 
It was not all that long ago that the debate swirled around the issue 
of whether, and to what extent, the Bill of Rights applied to the 
military justice system. For example, does the fourth amendment pro- 
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures applfl If so to 
what extent? It was not until the 1970’s that the Court of Military 
Appeals ruled that a service member confined before trial was en-. 
titled under the fourth amendment to an independent review of the 
commander’s decision ordering confinement.’* 
Most of the rights are now considered applicable. Long before the 
courts had decided that certain constitutional protections were 
available, the Congress had made such rights a part of the Articles 
of War and then later the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Even now, the question remains. Even assuming the protections 
apply, do they apply with the same force and effect as they do to 
the civilian community? The Supreme Court and Court of Military 
Appeals have indicated that the protections of the Bill of Rights apply 
to persons in the military except to the extent that they are overrid- 
den by demands of “discipline and duty.”lg Again, our answers are 
not purely academic. Without regard to what the Congress or the 
President says about the available due process protections, the Court 
of Military Appeals might very well make a constitutional issue out 
of it. 
Although debate continues about the scope of protections provid- 
ed by the fourth and fifth amendments, I would like to focus my com- 
ments on two particular rights that are found in civilian practice, 
17D. Schlueter, supra note 8, $5 1-4 to 1-6(c) (history of courts-martial). 
W e e  Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1976) (following Supreme Court’s deci- 
l8Id. at 270 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)). 
sion in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). 
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but not in military justice. They are the right to indictment by grand 
jury and the right to trial by jury. The first we can deal with sum- 
marily, the second requires a little more attention. 
2. Right to Indictment by Grand Jury 
Two rights that are conspicuously absent from the military justice 
system are the right to grand jury proceedings and the right to a jury 
trial. Both are considered essential elements of due process in the 
civilian community. Although their true utility and worth may be 
debated, they are part and parcel of American jurisprudence. Never- 
theless, they are missing from military justice. Whp  
In the case of indictment by grand jury, the fifth amendment ex- 
plicitly exempts cases arising in the armed forces. The absence of 
this right is generally noncontroversial because, in some ways, the 
military’s statutory article 32 pretrial investigation offers greater pro- 
tections for the military defendant.20 That is, article 32 offers the 
defendant the opportunity to discover the prosecution’s case, the 
ability of the defendant and his or her counsel to be present at the 
hearing, the opportunity to present defense evidence, and the op- 
portunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
3. The Right to Jury Dial 
Another right guaranteed by the United States Constitution that 
is not applicable in courts-martial is the sixth amendment right to 
a jury trial. Consequently, an accused being tried by a special court- 
martial may appear before a court consisting only of three in- 
dividuals. If the accused is being tried by a general court-martial, 
only five individuals are required for the court. In each of those in- 
stances, a verdict of guilty may be rendered on less than a unanimous 
vote. 21 
The Supreme Court in Ballew v. Georgiaz2 concluded that an ac- 
cused is denied his sixth amendment right to jury trial when the jury 
is composed of less than six persons. In Burch v. Louisiana,23 the 
Court held that if the jury consists of six, the verdict must be 
20Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988) [hereinafter UCMJ]. 
WCMJ art.  52(a)(l). A unanimous verdict is required before the court-martial may 
find an accused guilty of an offense for which the death penalty is a mandatory punish- 
ment. 
22435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
23441 US. 130 (1979). Nonunanimous findings are apparently permitted if the jury 
is composed of more than six persons. 
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unanimous. Nevertheless, the Supreme Courtz4 and the military 
courtsz5 have concluded that, because the sixth amendment right 
to jury trial does not apply to courts-martial, these cases are inap- 
plicable. Both the Court of Military Appeals and the Supreme Court 
have declined to revisit the issue. 
Central to the Court’s conclusions in Burch was the fact that below 
a certain number of jurors, the ability of the jury to interact in a 
meaningful way-that is to bring out and discuss all of the pertinent 
issues and competing arguments-was greatly diminished. Is not the 
same true for military courts? At least one court has said no.26 
Are there compelling arguments for the current composition of 
courts-martial-five members in a general court-martial and three 
in a special court-martial, with only two-thirds majority needed for 
a conviction? Why are we different? In the 1774 Articles of War, thir- 
teen members were required in general courts-martial, but in 1776 
the number was reduced to five. The reduction apparently was based 
upon the problem of finding sufficient officers in the units to serve 
as court members. Probably, tradition has had much to do with the 
current numbers. 
But a new tradition, if that term is appropriate, may be develop- 
ing. I understand that it is fairly common at some locations for the 
convening authority to include more than five members on general 
courts-martial. That practice does not seem to cause any problems. 
Notwithstanding the inaction of the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Military Appeals, why not amend the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice to require a minimum of six in general ~our t s -mar t i a l .~~  In 
capital cases make it twelve. As I have noted, for all practical pur- 
poses, more than the jurisdictional minimum number of members 
are being appointed at some installations. Why not simply make the 
emerging “tradition” a part of the Code? 
240’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U S .  258, 261 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U S  1, 37 n.68 
(1957). 
%‘ee, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 248 (C.M.A. 1988); United States v. 
Kemp, 46 C.M.R. 152, 154 (C.M.A. 1973). 
Wnited  States v. Corl, 6 M.J. 914 (N.M.C.M.R. 1979). Interestingly, the Navy court 
pointed out that the Supreme Court had relied upon data derived only from civilian 
sources, which had no probative value in the military context. Id. 
27Although I think similar reasoning could be used to support a court of six members 
for a “regular” special court-martial, the Supreme Court decisions would seem to sup- 
port less than six members when the offense being tried was a “petty” offense. Because 
the jurisdictional limit of a regular special court-martial is six months of confinement, 
the requirement of only three officers for that court, and the sixth amendment 
guarantees of a right to trial by jury, are more in tune with each other. 
17 
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [L’ol. 1:33 
The requirement of unanimity is another question. The reason 
usually given for not requiring unanimity is that it avoids the prob- 
lem of a “hung jury.” I really doubt that in most cases that is a real 
problem. To be in harmony with the Supreme Court cases I mentioned 
earlier, any court consisting of six or less members should be required 
to reach a unanimous verdict. An intermediate solution would be 
to require a unanimous verdict, as it is currently required in capital 
cases, on both findings and sentence when the maximum allowable 
punishment on the charged offenses is above a certain minimum, 
such as ten years. 
It  seems that the sixth amendment requirement of the right to a 
jury trial could be applied much more liberally than it currently is 
without doing any great harm to the way in which the military 
operates. As I will note later, one of the real sticking points in military 
justice is, not only the composition of the court, but also the method 
of selecting members. A good start at tackling that overall problem 
would be to give very serious consideration, as a number of com- 
mentators have, to the issue of the size of the court-martial. 
D. THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER 
1. The Eagle 
In the hallway of the main lobby of this School hangs a picture of 
the head of an eagle, entitled simply “The Commander.” To me the 
picture symbolizes the bold leader, the fearless leader, the leader will- 
ing to take the troops to new heights of pride and esprit de corps. 
A symbol of freedom and liberty. To even suggest taking the com- 
mander-the eagle-out of the American military justice system 
sounds unpatriotic. That is probably why the most appropriate role 
of the commander in the military justice system is perhaps one of 
the toughest to address. The commander always has been at the heart 
of the military justice system, and to suggest removing the com- 
mander from the system, or to limit the role of the commander in 
any way, is viewed by some as a sure demise of the uniqueness of 
the system.28 
Yet over the years, the commander’s role has been diminished 
somewhat . . . and the system has survived. For example, when I first 
came in the Army, the lives of young JAGS were consumed with draft- 
ing lengthy “post-trial reviews” that basically were an entire rehash 
”See United States v. Ralston, 24 M.J. 709, 711 (A.C.M.K. 1987) (Appcndix) .  
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of the trial-a detailed summary of each witness’s testimony, presen- 
tation of legal issues, presentation of evidence favorable to the defen- 
dant, resolution of legal issues, and a recommendation from the SJA 
to the commander. The system reached the point at which form clear- 
ly was being elevated over substance. 
In the Military Justice Act of 1983, those requirements were whit- 
tled down, largely because of the recognition that the posttrial review 
was primarily legal in nature and that lawyers could just as easily 
make some major decisions about the post-trial disposition of the 
case. 
In 1983, another major change took place. The commander was 
no longer required to appoint the counsel or the judge to the court- 
martial. That task for a number of years had really been pro forma 
anyway. 
2. Selection of Court Members (Jury) 
One important change was not made in 1983; the commander still 
selects the members who sit on the court. That, in my view, con- 
tinues to be a major problem area. Despite ail the areas in which 
the defendant is granted more protections, the commander still picks 
the jury. No matter how you view it or label it, the commander picks 
the people who will decide whether the accused committed the of- 
fense and, if so, what the punishment should be. 
In a concurring opinion in United States v. Smith ,2g a case address- 
ing the process used to select the members for the accused’s court- 
martial, Judge Cox noted that those responsible for the process 
should reflect upon its importance as a ‘‘solemn and awesome respon- 
sibility.” The process of selecting members, he said, “is the most vul- 
nerable aspect of the court-martial system; the easiest for the critics 
to attack. A fair and impartial court-martial is the most fundamen- 
tal protection that an accused servicemember has from unfounded 
or unprovable charges.’’30 
Why do we still have the commander selecting the members of the 
court? Do not misread me. Commanders are picked for their integri- 
ty, their honor, and their respect for the law. They are the “eagle”- 
the nation’s symbol. I am intimately familiar with the argument 
“27 M.J .  242 (C .M.A.  1988). 
:31bM. at 252.  
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(because I have used it myself) that the military ‘jury” is composed 
of top-notch people, most of them with college educations. I am 
aware that the commander is responsible for picking people who are 
mature and experienced. Despite those justifications for the present 
system, the selection process is subject to continual challenges. At 
a minimum, it looks bad. In legal parlance, the process can present 
an appearance of evil. The fact that the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Military Appeals have not ruled the process unconstitutional is 
no reason not to consider a revision seriously. If we were to apply 
a simple balancing test, would the benefit of the commander select- 
ing the court outweigh the problems and the perceptions that it 
causes? 
One alternative would be to go with some sort of random selec- 
tion. Everything is now on computers and they have become a 
routine part of every legal office. The computer could be programmed 
to turn out a cross-section of officers and enlisted members based 
upon the language of article 25 and could be used to weed out those 
who are due to rotate assignments or those who are scheduled for 
TDY. I cannot believe that the same ingenuity that coordinated the 
massive air strikes in the Middle East could not be used to select court 
members for a court-martial when a service member’s liberty and 
property interests are at stake. 
Whatever system is used, the role of the prosecutor and the com- 
mander in the selection process should be reduced, if not eliminated. 
Whatever administrative problems there might be, it simply has to 
be better than responding to allegations of stacked juries. 
3. Composition of the Courts 
If there is any doubt where the civilian community gets the im- 
pression that military courts are less than the paradigm of impar- 
tiality, consider a sampling of cases in the last several years in which 
defense counsel successfully or unsuccessfully challenged a number 
of court members. Notwithstanding repeated statements to the ef- 
fect that trial courts should grant challenges for cause liberally, the 
military courts generally have hesitated to overrule trial court rul- 
ings denying a wide range of challenges for cause. Consider the 
following sampling of cases in which such challenges were denied. 
-Members who were given efficiency ratings by other members 
of the court.31 
31United States v. Murphy. 26 M.J. 454, 455-56 (C.M.A. 1988) 
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-Members had been victims of multiple crimes.32 
-Member who had personal interest and professional interest in 
stopping bad checks sitting on a bad check case.33 
-Member who had extensive prior civilian experience as social 
services counselor appointed to child abuse case.34 
-Member who expressed abhorrence to sexual offense on child 
and acknowledged that his emotions would force him to be a lit- 
tle tougher on sentencing but that he could take cognizance of 
his emotions.36 
In the process of deciding these and many similar cases, the ap- 
pellate courts have concluded that court members can rehabilitate 
themselves through proper answers to the inquiring trial judge. At 
least one court has indicated that the trial judge may use leading 
questions in questioning the challenged court member.36 It should 
not be too difficult for any judge worth his or her salt to obtain a 
statement from the member that, despite some bias toward the ac- 
cused or the crime, the member will keep an open mind about the 
case. The system should not put either the members or the trial judge 
in that position. These instances and others like them are, in my view, 
self-inflicted wounds. Cumulatively, they present the appearance of 
evil.37 Put yourself in the position of the accused, the accused’s fami- 
ly, and the public generally. What is their view of the composition 
of the court? What would your view be if you were the accused? 
The problems associated with composition of courts-martial pro- 
bably need no statutory solution if those responsible for the assisting 
in the selection process heed Judge Cox’s admonition and take ex- 
traordinary efforts to select the most objective fact-finders available. 
4. Command Influence: The Mortal Enemy 
The one issue that poses the greatest threat to any attempt to in- 
3ZUnited States v. Smith, 25 M.J. 785, 788 (A.C.M.R. 1988). 
33United States v. Carns, 27 M.J. 820, 822 (A.C.M.R. 1988). 
34United States v. Towers, 24 M.J. 143, 146 (C.M.A. 1987). 
36United States v. Yardley, 24 M.J. 719, 723 (A.C.M.R. 1987). 
36United States v. Mayes, 28 M.J. 748, 752 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). 
37United States v. Swagger, 16 M.J. 759 (A.C.M.R. 1983). Incredibly, the convening 
authority appointed the provost marshal to the accused’s court-martial, in which he 
served as the president. The court noted that doing this created the appearance of 
evil and that individuals assigned to police duties should not be appointed to courts. 
Id. at 760. 
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crease the respect of the public is the proverbial problem of unlawful 
command influence-what the Court of Military Appeals has labelled 
the “mortal enemy” of military justice. Whatever means are ap- 
propriate to stop it, whether that means developing a vaccine, 
quarantining it, or warehousing it, we must get it off the streets. It 
is no friend of the Corps nor of the system. It has caused more distrust 
and personal turmoil than any other issue facing those running the 
military justice system. 
Do you know it when you see it? How will you know it? Will there 
be an official looking memo? How do you know that you have not 
become an unwitting victim of its snares? What should you do when 
you see it? 
From my personal experience, I will tell you that the issue is not 
always open and obvious. For example, when I was an energetic 
young JAGC captain serving as the Chief of Military Justice at Fort 
Belvoir I realized that we often had problems communicating with 
the members who had been selected to serve on a court-martial. They 
would end up calling our office to find out all sorts of information 
about the approximate length of the trial, where they should go, or 
what uniform they should wear. At about that same time, a colleague 
at another installation told me about a little booklet of information 
that they had worked up giving all of that information. I liked the 
idea and approached my boss with it. He objected. He pointed out 
to me that it was good to try to simplify the process, but that real 
dangers lurked in presenting “advice” or information to the mem- 
bers. He was concerned that anything said to the members, especially 
by the prosecution side of the house, might be interpreted to reflect 
the convening authority’s views. He also pointed out to me that the 
booklet I had heard about contained a brief introduction by the con- 
vening authority on the solemn duties of being a court member. Was 
my boss overreacting? At  the time I thought he might be. My motives 
were good. I simply wanted to make the system more efficient. But 
in looking back on that incident, it serves to remind me that no mat- 
ter how innocent the briefing, the memo, or the little talk might be, 
trouble lurks. 
For the next several years, we will all be keenly aware of the per- 
sonal heartache and the sense of embarrassment that can befall even 
the best lawyers and the best intentioned commanders. But how 
many remember the name-or have even heard the name-of the 
Commanding General at Fort Leonard Wood whose actions decades 
ago gave rise to what we now know as the DuBay hearing, or any 
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of the myriad other commanders or officers who said or did some- 
thing that resulted in a finding of unlawful command influence? Our 
institutional memories can be short, and in the process each genera- 
tion of new JAGS must face the threat of unlawful command in- 
fluence. 
5. Should the Commander Be Removed From the System 
I am not prepared to suggest that the commander-the eagle- 
should be removed totally from the system. My restraint is not based 
upon the fear of “civilianization” of military justice. Nor is my re- 
straint grounded upon a belief that the commander is an indispens- 
able element in military justice. Instead, I am restrained from sug- 
gesting complete removal because the military society-whether it 
be a post, camp, or station-is a “community.” Removing the com- 
mander totally from the processing of charges or the selection of 
court members would not necessarily stem the problem of the in- 
dignant commander who has just been informed that charges against 
the division’s drug lord have been dismissed on a “legal technicali- 
ty.” Nor would it stem the problem of subordinate commanders say- 
ing or doing things that threaten the integrity of the court-martial. 
It would be incorrect to blame the “commander” for all of the ills 
of command influence. If there is one clear lesson for us today, it 
is the responsibility of all those within the system, including lawyers, 
to do all that is within their power to ensure that the system ex- 
emplifies all that is right with justice in this country. 
The process of scrutinizing the role of the commander must con- 
tinue. The irony is that within the military, there exist the resources 
to combat virtually any problem that presents itself. Yet, the military 
cannot rid itself of this one menace. 
It may be that unlawful command influence never will be 
eradicated and it may be that other methods will have to be found 
to contain it. The question is, how strongly do we feel about 
eradicating it? After all of these years, the Court of Military Appeals 
finally has taken a stronger stand on the subject, and that is bound 
to make some difference. 
If the commander is to remain a key element in the military justice 
system, then what we say and do about maintaining the in- 
dependence of those called upon to judge the actions of the com- 
mander takes on even greater significance. 
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E.  THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY JUDICIARY 
1. The Military Judge 
If there is any hope of increasing respect for military justice it is 
absolutely essential that the trial and appellate judiciary continue 
to draw from the best and the brightest.38 It is the judges who are 
most often called upon to sort through and decide the knotty issues. 
such as unlawful command influence. Trial judges are at the cutting 
edge of the law, as they are in civilian life. Judges sitting in the trial 
courtroom bear an awesome responsibility to see to it that justice 
is done. The courtroom is where the public sees military justice.in 
action. The military judge, sitting in the predominant position in the 
courtroom, is the symbol of impartiality, not discipline: of justice, 
not discipline; of impartiality, not bias. 
For a military appellate judge, it means writing the persuasive opin- 
ion that spells out why the defendant was or was not granted a fair 
trial. Appellate judges are not nearly as visible to the civilian com- 
munity. But the task is just as important and vital. One feature that 
is often overlooked is that the military appellate courts have the 
authority to conduct an independent factual analysis. That gives 
them even more responsibility than that carried by their civilian 
counterparts who generally are required only to review questions 
of law. 
2. Assignments and Tenure 
I am aware that some have suggested that to maintain in- 
dependence it is important to stabilize tours for military judges or 
grant some sort of tenure that ensures them that no matter how un- 
popular their decisions, they have some security. I am not sure that 
is workable, but I would be willing to consider it. Why would such 
a change even be necessary? To protect trial and appellate judges? 
Once you start down the slippery slope of protecting the players who 
are called upon to call the tough shots, where would we stop? The 
SJA who initially tells the three-star general that his regulation is 
unconstitutional because it is overbroad? The JAG who helped write 
"This is a delicate matter. In the military justice system, all of the players a r t  im- 
portant. Rut I am afraid that, all too often, the goal of military lawyers is t o  h e  the 
chief lawyer in a large office. In the Army, that means a corps or  division SJA. What 
I am suggesting is that it is just as important to promote the idea that serving in the 
capacity of a trial or appellate judge is "career enhancing." This is not a lrgislativr 
issue; instead, it is a management issue 
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it, or unsuccessfully objected to it? The defense counsel who 
challenged it? The Court of Military Review that reviewed it? The 
answer in protecting these people from retribution lies, not in grant- 
ing tenure, but rather in taking appropriate action against any lawyer 
or commander who attempts to interfere with a trial or appellate 
judge's independence. All must understand that military justice is 
not simply a formality for deciding when the accused gets on the 
train for the Disciplinary Barracks. Anyone who views it in that light 
is doing the system a disservice. 
€? A N  INDEPENDENT COURT OF 
MILITARY APPEALS 
Several years ago, I served as the reporter for the committee that 
studied the Court of Military Appeals. The committee itself was com- 
posed of a number of distinguished individuals who had much to con- 
tribute to an in-depth analysis of what the court was about and how 
it could better perform the function it was originally designed to 
fulfill-civilian review of the military justice system.39 
Ironically, the committee was viewed by some as being a stacked 
deck-a handpicked committee that simply would endorse whatever 
the court wanted. Those of you who have read the report know that 
is not what happened. To the credit of Chief Judge Everett, the com- 
mittee was composed of independent thinkers. 
To say that the road the court has traveled since its formation in 
1950 has been smooth would be to ignore the obvious. The road has 
been rough. From the outset, the court has been criticized, maligned, 
poked at, and probed. Some of its judges have contributed more than 
others; some of its opinions have not stood the test of time, while 
others have become part and parcel of military justice. Through it 
all, the court has strived to meet the congressional mandate for 
thorough, independent civilian review of courts-martial. As the com- 
mittee concluded, it has done that.J0 The committee's suggested 
changes were set out in detail in the report that gained some atten- 
tion in the media-especially the committee's suggestion that the 
court consider less travel in its plans. 
One of the major issues addressed by the committee was the ques- 
tion of whether the court should be converted from an article I to 
~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ 
3HSrf~ 25 M.J.  at XClX (1987) (announcement o f  cow1 appointing co~imit t t~c)  
4oSrc~ 28 M.J 99.102 (report of committrc). 
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an article I11 court. The committee ultimately declined to take a final 
position on that question. Instead, it offered an alternative that 
would have the court remain as an article I court, with the appointed 
judges serving a term without years with retirement at age 70. The 
committee believed that the other recommendations should be in 
place first before the article I11 issue finally was decided. 
Interestingly, the Department of Defense was opposed to any at- 
tempts to make the court an article I11 court. In an exhaustive study 
of the issue, the 1988 Department of Defense report on the status 
of the court included the following language: 
Although Congress has stated its intent that COMA be a court 
in every sense of the word, COMA is not as fully independent 
as an Article I11 court. A COMA judge has no protection against 
salary reduction; does not have life tenure for good behavior; 
and can be removed by the President upon notice and hearing, 
for malfeasance in office, neglect or duty, or physical or men- 
tal disability. A sitting Chief Judge of COMA can be replaced; 
and COMA is still to a certain extent, dependent upon the Ex- 
ecutive Branch for administrative support. The question which 
needs to be answered is whether any of these differences 
significantly impacts on COMAS ability to fulfil its judicial 
duties.41 
. . . COMA is a limited court serving a limited need. Albeit dif- 
ferent, COMA is not unique among Art. I courts. Like other Ar- 
ticle I courts, COMA is not an independent instrument of justice. 
COMA is properly accountable to the Executive Branch, for it 
is the President as Commander in Chief who bears ultimate 
responsibility for the enforcement, through courts-martial of 
the congressionally-adopted rules and regulations governing the 
military forces. 
. . .  
. . . COMA is an integral part of the military justice system and 
should not be separate and apart from it. Care should be taken 
not to destroy the court's usefulness to the military judicial 
41L'nited States Court of Military Appeals Report, Jan. 2 7 ,  1989, at F-3 
421d. at A+, 6 
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A number of members on the committee observed that the more in- 
transigent the Department of Defense became on the court’s in- 
dependence, the greater the argument for some separation from the 
Department of Defense-in much the same way that the federal 
courts finally were separated from the Department of Justice in 
1939.43 
For now, the marriage between the court and the Department of 
Defense appears stable and wholesome. It has not always been so, 
however, and always lurking in the background is the specter of the 
court facing a difficult constitutional issue that challenges a key 
Department of Defense policy or regulation. 
Why does the Department of Defense feel uncomfortable with the 
suggestion of greater independence for the Court of Military Appeals? 
Is there a concern that the court will run away with military justice 
and civilianize it? Or do they fear that inexperienced and anti-military 
judges will be appointed? These are not unreasonable concerns. But, 
even as we speak, federal judges across the nation are reviewing deci- 
sions by military authorities and, for the most part, they are being 
deferential to the military. Finally, there is always Congress, to which 
the court is in more ways accountable than to the Department of 
Defense or to the Executive. I have no doubt that a runaway court 
could be held in check by Congress. 
Although I advocate greater independence for the court, I do not 
agree that the court should be the primary shaper or legislator of 
military justice. Most of you were not in the service in the 1970’s 
when the “Fletcher Court,” as we now call it, was churning out 
weekly revisions to the military justice system. If an aspect of military 
justice is unconstitutional, the court should have the authority to 
say so, although I never have favored a wholesale revision of military 
justice by any court acting as a super legislature. 
Whatever is said or not said about the Court of Miiitary Appeals, 
it is absolutely essential that it remain as independent as it possibly 
can be. The court should stand as the symbol of independent civilian 
review. That is what Congress intended when it created it in 1950. 
G. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
How many of you have been asked-What do military lawyers do 
430ne of the reasons for separating the administrative support of the federal courts 
from the Department of Justice was that one of the litigants appearing before those 
courts-the Department-had administrative control over those same courts. 
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for a living The answer is that military lawyers make the military 
justice system work. They are the key to the success of the system. 
The system is only as good as the folks running it. I do not mean to 
ignore mention of the essential support staff- the legal clerks and 
administrators who make sure that the lawyers are working on the 
right file and that the record of trial is correctly assembled. For the 
critics, you represent the system. You are the lawyers. You are respon- 
sible for making it work well. 
If the military justice system is to be respected, it is important that 
when we, as lawyers, “cut the wood placed in front of us,” we do 
it right. Many of the problems that I have addressed today are the 
result of human error. That is, the underlying statutes and regula- 
tions may have provided ample protection, but somewhere along the 
line an eager lawyer or commander, “cutting his or her pile of wood,” 
attempted to “cut” corners, “whittle” away the accused’s rights, or 
“stack” the court. 
Other problems or issues I have discussed today are embedded in 
the system itself and will require lawyers to work out with fine 
surgical precision any changes in the system’s structure. Within a few 
short weeks some of you will be in a JAG office for the first time. 
Whether the system gets the respect it deserves will depend as much 
on you-who will be serving as trial or defense counsel-as it will 
on the shoulders of those here today who are in, or will be in, posi- 
tions of leadership. 
Aside from your duties as a JAG officer, it is important that you 
become involved in professional bar associations, such as the 
American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, or your state 
and local bar associations. In the process, you will present a positive 
image of military law and you will continue to learn about the civilian 
system. Write articles for civilian periodicals. Inform the public not 
only about what you do, but what military law is all about. 
The key is to contribute. We sometimes ask our children, Are you 
part of the solution or are you part of the problem? Today I have 
raised suggested solutions to a wide variety of potential or real prob- 
lems. But we must continue to ask ourselves: Are we being part of 
the problem, or are we part of the solution? 
111. CONCLUSION 
While there is no doubt in my mind that, at its core, the military 
justice system is an excellent model, it is important to discuss prob- 
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lem areas that deserve scrutiny. Some can be handled only through 
legislative efforts. Others can be addressed through slight, internal 
and informal changes in methodology. If the 1990’s are to see any 
real change in the perception of military justice, some changes are 
needed. Quick fixes through name changes will not suffice. The 
system itself must be examined. 
The goal of criminal justice always should be to ensure justice- 
not just convictions. The natural state of things is that the process 
will continue to evolve. But in that evolution, will military justice 
in the 1990’s lag behind or pull ahead? With your help, it will become 
the best that it can be and receive the respect it deserves. 
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